29 de novembro de 2024

Summary of COP 29

Our traditional COP summary provides an overview of the negotiations at COP 29 and its key outcomes.

It was already clear that adopting a new, fair climate finance goal at this COP would be extremely challenging, considering the current geopolitical context, the inherent complexity and sensitivity of the financing discussions within the UNFCCC, and the circumstances that led the oil based Baku to take the presidency of this COP. However, no one could have imagined that it would be possible to accumulate so many failures in a single COP.

COP 29 may be remembered as the COP that failed to deliver. It did not deliver a decision to operationalize the Just Transition Work Programme – a programme that will continue for another year, entirely hollowed out with an undefined scope. It did not deliver a decision to implement the recommendations of the Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement and ensure that the next round of NDCs will align with its outcomes, including a transition away from fossil fuels. And it did not deliver a unanimous decision on the new climate finance goal, with numerous objections raised during plenary sessions and ambiguous, unassertive language.

Apart from the long-awaited decision on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, COP 29 was not only unrepresentative in terms of substantial progress on the UNFCCC agenda, but also contributed to destabilizing trust in the multilateral process as a means of cooperation to address the climate crisis, due to the presidency’s lack of transparency and obstructive leadership, even during plenary sessions. As always in these negotiations, decisions are won at the expense of others’ fatigue.

The responsibility will fall to Brazil at COP 30 next year to “save” the UNFCCC regime from this crisis of trust.

But first… about LACLIMA

LACLIMA – Latin American Climate Lawyers Initiative for Mobilizing Action – is an institute dedicated to studying, researching, developing, and disseminating knowledge on climate change law in Brazil and Latin America. Our work aims to support Brazilian and Latin American society in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, the promotion of a decarbonized economy, and the building of a climate-resilient society with climate justice.

Since 2019, LACLIMA has been actively involved in the negotiations of the UNFCCC regime, systematically monitoring the key items on the negotiation agenda, producing content, and informing and training members and organizations of Brazilian civil society and other countries in Latin America.

LACLIMA tracks the progress of the negotiations, the agenda, and the outcomes of events and meetings mandated by the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COP) and the Paris Agreement, through its Paris Agreement Monitor, a monthly newsletter sent by email. Anyone can subscribe to receive the Paris Agreement Monitor by email at the bottom of the Paris Agreement Observatory page on our website.

LACLIMA also fosters a network of legal professionals and law students, now with over 1,350 members from Latin America, called the “LACLIMA Network.” This initiative aims to create a community of trained and engaged professionals, promoting actions focused on education, research, and awareness in the field of climate law. If you are a latin american law student, graduate, or attorney and are interested in joining the LACLIMA Network, please access the registration form.

Our Work at COP 29

LACLIMA was present at COP 29 with a delegation of six lawyers, monitoring the negotiations on topics such as Adaptation, Loss and Damage, Carbon Markets, Mitigation, Finance, Just Transition, Technology Transfer, and Transparency, with the primary goal of conveying the progress of the negotiations to civil society. Six briefing meetings were held throughout the conference, which can be accessed on LACLIMA’s Instagram or via the links below:

• Briefing on 11/15 with updates on the negotiations
• Briefing on 11/16 with MMA and MRE on the overall review of the first week of COP 29
• Briefing on 11/19 with updates on the negotiations
• Briefing on 11/20 with MRE on transparency
• Briefing on 11/21 with Mary Robinson’s opening remarks and updates on the negotiations

LACLIMA’s delegation also trained 12 young people throughout the year and 6 young people aged 20 to 28 from the brazilian states of BA, CE, PA, PE, SP, and TO during COP 29, in partnership with the Climate Reality Project Brazil through the “Operação COP” project. This project aims to train young leaders specializing in climate negotiations by offering training and workshops on the most relevant topics of the UNFCCC regime. The young people attended COP 29, accompanying LACLIMA delegates in the negotiation rooms, learning firsthand how the multilateral climate negotiation process works.

Over the two weeks, LACLIMA also participated in 15 COP 29 panel discussions.

LACLIMA’s delegation included executive board members Flávia Bellaguarda, Caroline Rocha, and André Santos, as well as coordinators and consultants Gaia Hasse, Enéas Xavier, Juliana Marcussi, Maria Gabriella, and Yago Freire. Also present were LACLIMA Council members Caroline Prolo, Carlos Rittl, and Rodrigo Sluminsky. This was all made possible thanks to the administrative support team at LACLIMA, Bárbara Prado and Giovana Serra, and the communications team at Causo and Mariana Maraschin.

Climate Finance

The climate finance agenda at COP 29 addressed various negotiation items. However, countries chose to focus their efforts primarily on the new Quantified Collective Climate Finance Goal (NCQG), given the deadline to adopt a decision on this matter at this COP.

History of the Negotiations

Discussions on the NCQG began with the reactions of the Parties to the draft text prepared by the co-facilitators of the ad hoc working programme. This preliminary text was widely rejected as it did not adequately reflect the views of the Parties. As a result, the document was reworked and expanded, enabling progress on some technical issues such as transparency, access to finance, and capacity-building. Despite these incremental advances, no significant progress was made on the core elements of the goal by the end of the first week.

At the end of the first week, the text was sent to the COP Presidency, which took steps to accelerate the negotiations. Two ministers were appointed to engage politically with the Parties in an attempt to achieve progress on key issues such as the total value of the goal (quantum), the contributors’ base, and the overall financing structure. Additionally, under the Presidency’s guidance, sessions with the heads of delegations were held to address the technical aspects of the goal. Furthermore, Brazil and the United Kingdom were invited to advise the Presidency in the search for balanced outcomes at COP 29.

Throughout the second week of negotiations, several versions of the NCQG draft decision were released, reflecting the ongoing interactions between the Parties. Initially, a simplified compilation of proposals was presented as a transition to the Presidency’s preliminary decision text, including options emanating from the ministerial consultations. This document was considered balanced, containing both qualitative and quantitative elements, including obligations for provision by developed countries, regional finance floors, and provisions for vulnerable countries, grants or highly concessional financing, among other provisions. However, as the negotiations progressed, the Presidency released a new version of the text, with a more streamlined and simplified wording. While this version sought to facilitate consensus, it was widely criticized for its ambiguous language and for omitting essential elements. It did not explicitly mention obligations for the provision of resources, considering a global goal under the responsibility of all actors to mobilize USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035. The text also did not address human rights nor exclude certain financial flows, such as loans, from climate finance accounting. Furthermore, the new wording did not incorporate any position opposing investments in fossil fuels, raising concerns about its adequacy to promote a just and effective climate transition.

Adopted Decision

The adopted decision calls on “all actors” to work together to facilitate the scaling-up of finance for developing countries from all public and private sources, to reach at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035.

Specifically concerning developed countries, it decides to establish a goal “as an extension of the goal” of USD 100 billion per year referred to in paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP.21. This goal entails developed countries taking the lead, with a contribution of at least USD 300 billion per year until 2035 for developing country Parties. Although it is the responsibility of developed countries to take the lead in delivering this portion of the goal, it can be achieved from a wide variety of sources, both public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources; and it may account for all climate-related financial flows, including climate finance mobilized by multilateral development banks. The call from developing countries for a specific allocation of the goal for public finance provision by developed countries did not materialize.

The decision encourages developing countries to also make contributions, including through South-South cooperation, on a voluntary basis.

The decision further emphasizes the critical importance of significantly reducing the cost of capital, increasing the mobilization ratio of public finance sources by 2030, and creating fiscal space in developing countries through the use of innovative instruments, such as first-loss instruments, guarantees, local currency financing, and foreign exchange risk mitigation instruments.

In terms of quantum, the decision also provides for a significant increase in public resources through the operational entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and the Special Climate Change Fund, and further commits to making efforts to at least triple the annual flows to these funds from the 2022 levels by 2030.

In terms of process, the “Baku to Belém Roadmap for the 1.3 Trillion” is launched, aiming to scale up climate finance for developing countries to support low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways, as well as to implement NDCs and National Adaptation Plans, including through grants, concessional and debt-free instruments, and measures to create fiscal space, taking into account relevant multilateral initiatives as appropriate. The Presidencies of the respective COPs are tasked with producing a report summarizing the work as it is completed by COP 30/CMA 7.

Finally, it is decided that a review of the implementation of this decision will be carried out as part of the Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement, and deliberations will begin on the next steps before 2035, including a review of this decision in 2030.

“Consensus” in the Adoption

After the President of COP 29/CMA 6 proclaimed the adoption of the decision, India took the floor to explicitly express its objection to the adoption of the decision, stating that it intended to speak before the President gavelled the decision (the President read the report and immediately gavelled, without waiting for Party reactions and without the usual announcement “Hearing no objections, it is so decided,” catching everyone by surprise). Following this, Bolivia, Nigeria, and the Least Developed Countries Group also endorsed India’s position. The President took note of the countries’ statements and proceeded with the session, maintaining the adopted decision.

For an analysis of the consensus process in the UNFCCC, we recommend reading this opinion prepared by our colleagues at Legal Response International.

Adaptation

The adaptation negotiation agenda faced several challenges at COP 29. While negotiations on the Report and Review of the Adaptation Committee (AC) were blocked by the African Group of Negotiators, no decision was reached on the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) due to resistance from developed countries to include commitments on climate finance provision for the production of NAPs. As a result, the discussion was deferred to the following year. Consequently, attention was fully focused on negotiations regarding the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), which centered on three key aspects: (i) the UAE-Belém work program on indicators for measuring progress towards the thematic and dimensional targets set at COP 28, (ii) aspects related to paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5, which concern operational issues for the functioning of the GGA and its relation to future Global Stocktake processes, and (iii) discussions on the concept of transformational adaptation and its possible relation to the GGA.

After two intense weeks of debate, consensus among the Parties was painstakingly reached, resulting in a decision that defines the path of the GGA towards Belém. The decision reaffirms the request for the expert group to conduct a review and refinement of the mapping of indicators to measure progress on adaptation targets, confirming that the final decision on the list of indicators will be made by CMA 7, in Belém.

A key highlight is the recognition of the importance of gender balance and geographical diversity among the members of the expert group, as well as the emphasis on the relevance of including traditional knowledge, indigenous peoples, and local knowledge systems within the work program on indicators. The decision also encourages ongoing dialogue between Parties, experts, and other stakeholders in the process of refining and developing indicators, with provisions for dialogues and workshops to take place over the next year to facilitate progress on this complex task.

The text highlights additional criteria for the potential set of indicators, which include: measurability and data availability to allow transparent monitoring of progress; the ability to use data that is already available or easily collectable; the use of established and available metrics; relevance to multiple thematic goals; and results-oriented guidance. To avoid imposing additional reporting burdens on countries, the decision also specifies that the final outcome of the UAE-Belém Work Program on indicators should consist of a manageable set of no more than 100 indicators.

These indicators must also be globally applicable and compiled into a menu covering a range of adaptation action contexts, allowing Parties to choose which indicators they will report on, based on their national circumstances. Additionally, they must be designed to allow the assessment of progress in relation to fulfilling the various components of the targets.

The decision also acknowledges the importance of the indicators being able to capture information related to social inclusion, indigenous peoples, participatory processes, human rights, gender equality, migrants, children and youth, and persons with disabilities. Furthermore, there is provision for both quantitative and qualitative indicators to be mapped to facilitate the implementation of adaptation actions.

The reference to means of implementation, i.e., the availability of finance, capacity-building, and technology transfer for adaptation actions, was only included in the final stages of COP 29 and was still very tangential. The decision foresees that technical experts will develop, as necessary, enabling factors indicators for the implementation of adaptation actions, including means of implementation. Additionally, the final outcome of the UAE-Belém Work Program should also include these qualitative and quantitative indicators for enabling factors for adaptation implementation, including means of implementation.

In parallel, adopting a suggestion made by the Arab Group, which initially encountered resistance, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap was launched, with the aim of advancing progress in line with Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement and supporting the implementation of the elements described in paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5. The Parties agreed that there was insufficient time to deeply discuss views on these aspects, and therefore discussions will continue at a future point.

Finally, regarding transformational adaptation, the Parties opted for an intermediate solution: they recognized that both incremental and transformational adaptation approaches are essential to protect the well-being of people and the planet, acknowledged the technical report prepared by the Secretariat, but decided to continue considerations on this issue next year.

Article 6

Unlike the failure at COP 28 with the lack of decisions on the topic, progress on the operationalization of the cooperative instruments under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement began early with a decision during the opening plenary of COP regarding the Paris Agreement Credit Mechanism (PACM) under Article 6.4. In this decision, the Parties agreed to acknowledge the adoption, by the Supervisory Body of the Mechanism (SBM), of requirements for the approval of methodologies and activities for the removal of GHGs from the atmosphere. These requirements will form the basis for selecting activities that may issue certified emission units, to be traded in the market.

With this resolved, countries were able to advance on other essential resolutions for the implementation of the market. As a result, decisions and mandates were established, including a request to the SBM to accelerate the work on implementing the mechanism’s registry and creating standards and guidelines related to the selection of activities that will issue credits. In addition, discussions were held on the authorization process for corresponding adjustments for the use of these credits in fulfilling NDCs or other international mitigation purposes. A deadline extension was also granted for the transition of forestry activities already registered under the Clean Development Mechanism to the Article 6.4 mechanism, with transition requests to be submitted by 31 December 2025.

Following these decisions, work can now begin on detailing the requirements for approving the activities that will generate Article 6.4 credits and on the implementation of the registry framework and processes for the functioning of the mechanism.

Regarding cooperative approaches (Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement) aimed at the international transfer of mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), negotiations began with the challenge of a 43-page draft decision, full of options and divergent positions from countries. Throughout the conference, and after being urged by the SBSTA Chair and the COP Presidency, negotiators worked together to overcome their differences, and by the end of the first week, a clean 19-page draft decision was produced. This text became the basis for negotiations in the second week, which mostly took place in closed-door meetings, without the participation of observers.

Based on this decision, countries bilaterally sought to resolve the remaining points of divergence, such as (i) the authorization process required for the use of ITMOs; (ii) the information that should be included in these authorizations and the possibility of altering or revoking authorizations in the future; (iii) the inclusion of additional information to be communicated in the initial reporting of ITMO agreements; (iv) the rules regarding the first transfer of ITMOs; (v) the forms and tables to be used for annual reporting of information; (vi) the process for identifying, notifying, and correcting inconsistencies found in reports as part of the technical review team’s work under Article 6; (vii) interoperability between the international registry under Article 6.2 and the registry under Article 6.4, and additional functionalities for the Article 6.2 international registry to support countries that do not have a national registry, among other deliberations.

The instrument under Article 6.8 – the sharing and use of non-market approaches (NMAs) for mitigation and adaptation – had a quicker resolution. By the end of the first week, the Parties reached an agreement on the draft decision, which was sent directly for approval by the CMA. It reflected the activities carried out during COP aimed at exchanging information on developing NMAs, success stories, as well as initiatives to support capacity-building, technology transfer, and finance. It was also noted that countries had begun registering NMAs on the Platform created by the Secretariat to optimize the exchange of such information.

During the negotiations, some countries proposed initiatives to foster connections between the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity, to explore possible synergies between NMAs and joint initiatives. This proposal was not accepted, but the decision recognizes the importance of developing NMAs that link addressing climate change to biodiversity conservation and sustainable development, including what they referred to as Mother Earth-focused Actions, composed of different value systems, including those aimed at living in harmony and balance with Mother Earth.

Finally, the Parties prepared for the continuation of capacity-building and information-sharing activities, both through the Platform and through events to be held throughout the coming year, aiming to encourage broader participation from stakeholders such as international organizations, technical experts, the private sector, civil society organizations, indigenous peoples, and financial institutions.

Mitigation

The main agenda item for mitigation at COP 29 was the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP). This work programme became one of the most polarized issues, with Parties adopting firm and inflexible positions, especially regarding the possibility of the MWP addressing metrics and mitigation gaps identified in the COP 28 decision on the Global Stocktake (GST). Developing countries from the LMDC group and the Arab Group remained steadfast in their opposition to the idea that the outcomes of the GST should guide the work of the MWP. Countries like Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) pressed for the opposite direction.

The LMDC and the Arab Group justified their position by arguing that including metrics or targets, even collective ones, in the MWP would undermine the nationally determined nature of mitigation commitments, which they considered unacceptable. Brazil, on the other hand, did not align with either side of the polarization, advocating that the MWP should be a space for trust-building and experience-sharing among Parties, focusing on implementation rather than increasing mitigation ambition.

Due to the lack of consensus in the first week, the Parties applied Rule 16 of the UNFCCC rules of procedure, which postpones discussions to the following year without considering any of the documents produced during the current session.

However, due to significant efforts by the Presidency and pressure from countries that wanted to see the discussions continue during this session, it was possible to resume negotiations in the second week. The MWP negotiations thus restarted from scratch, with Parties invited to express their expectations for the CMA 6 decision on the programme. Despite the reiteration of old disagreements, Brazil’s proposal for the creation of a digital platform that connects mitigation initiatives and projects with potential investors was generally well-received.

In this new context, Parties agreed to exclude references to the GST and the mitigation gaps recognized in the Dubai decision. Brazil’s proposal for the creation of a “digital platform to facilitate the implementation of mitigation actions, promoting collaboration among governments, financiers, and other stakeholders in the development of investable projects in a way that aligns with national interests and is determined by the country itself” was retained. This initiative could give the MWP a new purpose, with its implementation to be discussed at the Bonn conference in 2025.

The decision adopted in plenary takes note of Brazil’s proposal and invites Parties, observers, and other stakeholders to submit their views on the design and characteristics of the aforementioned platform through the submission portal by 1 May 2025, with the aim of holding an exchange of views in Bonn in June 2025.

Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement

The controversial issue that blocked progress on the MWP in the first week was addressed in the decision of the UAE-Dialogue, an agenda item intended to discuss the modalities for a continued dialogue on the implementation of the recommendations from the First Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement adopted at COP 28. There was high expectation that this agenda item would address how to monitor the implementation of the First Global Stocktake to ensure that the new NDCs follow these guidelines, including those related to the transition away from fossil fuels. However, the discussions proved contentious from the start, with the LMDC group strongly resisting the issue and attempting to frame it solely as a discussion on financing for the adoption of the recommended measures.

In the end, the draft decision submitted to the plenary was a significantly watered-down version, but it included some elaboration on the operationalization of the dialogue through parallel tracks for monitoring the recommendations from the GST, covering mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, and response measures.

However, the text was widely rejected during the final plenary, and Rule 16 was applied, deferring the matter to be considered at the next COP.

Loss and Damage

With the adoption of decisions at COP 28 regarding the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund and the Santiago Network, and the conclusion of a politically charged decision-making cycle on Loss and Damage, expectations for COP 29 were that the negotiations on the seemingly straightforward items on the negotiation agendas would be more technical and less contested. However, this proved to be incorrect right from the first week. Kenya’s dissatisfaction with the decision to place the Santiago Network Secretariat in Geneva became a significant negotiating barrier. In the end, the Parties agreed on a procedural decision, vaguely recognizing the progress of the work of the WIM and the Santiago Network, but deferring discussions on the Joint Annual Report (JAR) and the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) to SB62. Once again, the Parties indicated that considerations regarding the governance of the WIM will continue to be discussed at COP 30/CMA 7.

On the other hand, the negotiations concerning the review of the first year of operations of the Loss and Damage Fund since its operationalization by COP 28 advanced, resulting in the adoption of a decision that, among other things, recognizes the selection of the Philippines as the host country for the Fund’s Board, and the signing of the cooperation agreement. The decision also acknowledges the work of the World Bank in the operationalization of the Fund. The decision further expresses gratitude for the donation pledges made to the Fund by the governments of Australia, Austria, Estonia, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and Sweden, as well as the government of the Wallonia Region in Belgium.

Just Transition

At COP 29, there was an expectation to engage the Just Transition Work Programme in substantive negotiation processes. However, this expectation was frustrated during the first week, as no consensus could be reached among the Parties on the draft decision that would serve as a basis for negotiations during the political week.

The second week of the COP was marked by silence in the corridors and negotiation rooms. While the Presidency and the delegations of Brazil and the United Kingdom conducted consultations with regional delegations, there was no text to be shared, and the Parties had no mandate to self-organize or hold informal discussions. As a result, the Presidency presented a text on Thursday morning (the penultimate day of formal negotiations), containing some textual options but offering little substantive progress toward effectively operationalizing the work programme.

On the morning of what was expected to be the final day of negotiations, the Presidency issued a communication stating that new draft decisions would be shared by noon, inviting Parties to provide specific contributions, with the aim of presenting a final text by midnight on Friday, 22 November, ahead of the plenary on Saturday, 23 November 2024.

By noon on 22 November, a new draft was presented, which in essence contained four main points:

1. The text mentioned terms like “human rights” and “gender” merely as acknowledgments, without establishing any concrete linkages.
2. Regarding the two annual dialogues held in 2024, there were disagreements among the Parties, with the G77 + China opposing the inclusion of this reference due to criticisms of the perceived imbalance in how the processes were conducted. As a result, the text only acknowledged the work of the Subsidiary Bodies in organizing the dialogues, without mentioning their outcomes.
3. Concerning the scope of the work plan, the text emphasized that aspects related to energy, the workforce, and socioeconomic considerations should be addressed in a balanced manner, avoiding an excessive focus on workforce issues—a priority more strongly advocated by developed countries.
4. The fourth and most significant point was Brazil’s proposal to establish a committee to explore concrete outcomes for this work programme. Although this specific proposal was not included, the draft decision invited Parties, observers, and other stakeholders to submit their views on concrete outcomes to achieve the objectives of the work programme, in line with paragraph 2 of decision 3/CMA.5. Additionally, it called for a compilation of these views to be presented at the next session of the Subsidiary Bodies.

However, the text was rejected during the final plenary, and Rule 16 was applied, deferring the matter for consideration at the next COP.

Technology Transfer

At COP 29, the central themes related to technology transfer focused on the assessment and future of the Poznan Strategic Program on Technology Transfer (PSP), launched at COP 14 in 2008. This program aims to facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) to developing countries, addressing local priorities and specific needs. Another key point was the structuring of the Technology Implementation Program (TIP), which was initially discussed at COP 28. The expectation is that this new program will strengthen the implementation of climate technologies essential for global mitigation and adaptation to climate change.

During the negotiations, delegations reached a consensus on the beginning of the phase-out of the PSP and a general assessment of the program. Regarding the TIP, there was intense debate but no consensus. The main points of divergence included the program’s structure, with proposals for the creation of a technology implementation accelerator and a knowledge transfer hub. Additionally, there was discussion on the involvement of civil society organizations in the process and the inclusion of initiatives within its scope to facilitate access for developing or least developed countries to technologies, such as the flexibilization of intellectual property rights and overcoming trade barriers. However, these issues were deferred to the following year.

In summary, the decision: acknowledges the efforts of the GEF in financing and implementing the program’s initiatives in recent years; requests the preparation of a report assessing the Poznan Strategic Program, to be completed by June 2026, with an overview of the progress made, key challenges faced, and successes and lessons learned during implementation; requires an analysis of the report to be discussed at COP 31 to support activities identified in NDCs, national adaptation plans, technology needs assessments, and long-term strategies of developing countries. Additionally, the process will help inform the next steps of the TIP; and recommends a final decision on the creation and structuring of the TIP at COP 30.

Transparency

The Baku Conference represents a significant milestone for transparency in the context of the Paris Agreement, as it is the last meeting before the submission of Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) in December 2024. It is important to note that the Parties had already agreed that 2024 would be the transition year from Biennial Reports (BRs) and Biennial Update Reports (BURs) (transparency reports under the UNFCCC) to the BTRs.

However, given the possibility that countries may withdraw from the Paris Agreement but remain in the UNFCCC, the need for these countries to continue submitting reports under the Convention was discussed. In this scenario, countries that are not Parties to the Paris Agreement would continue to submit BRs (for Annex I countries) or BURs (for non-Annex I countries). The Secretariat would continue preparing synthesis reports of the Convention’s instruments, even if few or just one report was submitted. While no official document from the negotiations reflected this discussion, it is expected that this issue will return in the Bonn session in June 2025, especially if the United States or other countries begin the process of exiting the Paris Agreement while remaining in the UNFCCC.

Another key point of the negotiations was funding for transparency. Developing countries reported difficulties accessing adequate resources and capacity-building to meet the BTR requirements. On the other hand, developed countries argued that the funds available through the Global Environment Facility (GEF) had not been fully utilized by eligible countries.

Discussions advanced on which developing countries would have the right to access these funds (whether all developing countries or only the poorest) and how to make financial flows and access more efficient.

In this context, the decision recognized that developing countries need additional support in institutional arrangements, data management, and capacity-building, as appropriate, to strengthen their capacities related to data collection, analysis, and management. It also requested that the Secretariat organize workshops with the participation of the GEF to facilitate exchanges of experiences between countries in order to identify and overcome difficulties faced in preparing the BTRs.

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Image: IISD/ENB | Mike Muzurakis